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ROUND TABLE

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A RADIO DISCUSSION OF

AMERICA AND THE GERMAN-SOVIET WAR

JACOBY · ROPER · SCHUMAN

383d BROADCAST IN COOPERATION WITH THE NATIONAL BROADCASTING COMPANY · 171

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ROUND TABLE

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NOTE

The supplementary information contained in the footnotes to the following text, developed by staff research, is not to be considered as representing the opinions of the ROUND TABLE *speakers. Following the transcript of the broadcast are questions which readers may wish to use for analysis and discussion. It is hoped that teachers and discussion leaders may find this additional service of the* ROUND TABLE *transcript helpful in their study of the subject discussed in the broadcast.*

AMERICA AND THE GERMAN-SOVIET WAR

A UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO ROUND TABLE BROADCAST*

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ELMO ROPER, Director, *Fortune* Magazine Poll

FREDERIC SCHUMAN, Woodrow Wilson Professor of Government, Williams College

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* A radio discussion broadcast from Radio City, New York, over the Red Network of the National Broadcasting Company, Sunday, June 22, 1941, at :30 P.M., Eastern Daylight Saving Time.

The ROUND TABLE, oldest educational program continuously on the air, is broadcast entirely without a script. Subjects are chosen because of their social, political, or economic significance. The program has no "ax to grind." In the selection of speakers, the effort is to provide a balanced discussion by participants who have special competence and knowledge. The opinion of each speaker is his own and in no way involves the responsibility of either the University of Chicago or the National Broadcasting Company.

AMERICA AND THE GERMAN-SOVIET WAR

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A few hours before dawn on Sunday, June 22, German troops crossed the border of the Soviet Union. Ending a week of tension and rumor, the word of the invasion came as a shock to some, produced even wider speculation, and raised new problems for world-diplomacy.

How would this new phase of the war affect America? Did it mean, as some suggested, that America need not be so concerned about defense and about aiding Great Britain? Did it mean, as others suggested, that the war against Britain would end soon? Would the democracies rally to the assistance of the U.S.S.R?

Had Chancellor Hitler at last decided that the "Drang nach Osten" of "Mein Kampf" was, after all, Germany's real objective? If so, why?

Canceling its scheduled broadcast less than twelve hours before air-time, the University of Chicago ROUND TABLE *called upon three expert observers to analyze these and other questions in a discussion of "America and the German-Soviet War."*

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MR. JACOBY: This German-Russian war is a perfectly understandable event in the flow of recent history from an economic point of view. Hitler is trying to create—indeed, he *must* create—an economically self-sufficient European state if his new order is to endure. There never has been a sound economic basis for Russo-Ger-

man accord because Germany requires Russian resources in order to round out her economic structure, and it simply wasn't in the cards for Soviet Russia voluntarily to surrender control over those resources and to become a junior partner in the Axis.

That is my view as an economist. Schuman, to what conclusions do your political and historical studies lead?

MR. SCHUMAN: I think that Adolf Hitler has just about abolished the distinction between economics and politics and strategy and psychology. I would like to offer the tentative view at the outset that Hitler's real object in this war is to corrupt and poison and confuse American public opinion. It seems to me that, in the face of a rising tide of American determination to thwart his plans for world-conquest, Adolf Hitler has taken a very dangerous but a very shrewd step which will insure his final victory if Americans and Britishers permit themselves to be confused by it and deflected from their central task; but if Britishers and Americans decline to be confused and befuddled by Hitler's fresh resort to the ancient "red-herring" technique, then it seems to me very probable that Hitler has made a fatal mistake which presents his enemies with a golden opportunity.

This war, after all, is in many of its aspects and in its present phase a war for mastery of the American public mind. Wouldn't you agree, Roper, as an authority on public opinion, that that is a very crucial aspect of the world-struggle?

MR. ROPER: I think that Hitler probably has in mind both the political and public morale you mention and the economic phase that Jacoby mentions. But I think, if he is as astute an observer of public opinion as he is credited with being, he must at this time be placing more reliance on the economic gains he is about to make—or thinks he is about to make—than on the gains he might think he would make in American public opinion.

MR. SCHUMAN: It is interesting to note that in the official explanations offered at Berlin for the Nazi attack on Soviet Russia nothing at all is said about the economic aspect. The emphasis

seems rather to be on the old story: The Reich has again become a victim of aggression. All the fascist dictatorships seem to be peculiarly allergic to aggression.[1] This is the old story of the Chinese "attack" on Japan, the Ethiopian "attack" on Italy, the Spanish "attack" on the Axis, the Czechoslovakian "attack" on Germany, and now the Soviet "attack" on the Reich.

MR. JACOBY: But I can't believe you are so naïve as to expect to find in the official dispatches from Berlin the true, the *real*, reasons for the attack. After all, we rarely find in any official dispatches from any country—least of all from Germany—the real reasons for any event.

MR. SCHUMAN: Far from it! The gentlemen at Berlin are past masters in the art of mendacity. I am simply noting here that what they are saying now is what they have said in each instance of aggression up to date.

MR. JACOBY: Before we get into this discussion hot and heavy, let's make it a factual discussion—no labels. We are not talking as interventionists or isolationists. We are trying to present, from such expert knowledge as we possess, the various factors in this situation.

First of all, why did Hitler attack?

MR. ROPER: I should be interested in hearing your explanation, as an economist, of the possible economic motives.

MR. JACOBY: Perhaps I overstress the economic factors in historical events, but it seems to me that here the economic motive plays a very important role. Germany needs Ukrainian wheat; she needs Caucasian oil. Unfortunately, I cannot cite definite facts and figures because both Germany and Soviet Russia have done a grand job of concealing their production figures [*see illustration, page 7*], but we do know this: before the war Germany was about 80 per

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[1] *The German statement by Adolf Hitler as to war causes was read on the early morning of Sunday, June 22, by Field Marshall Göring.*

cent self-sufficient with regard to food and only about 30 per cent self-sufficient with regard to oil. That was before the war. We don't know what has happened since, but it seems unlikely, with the increasing demands of an army of 3,500,000 moving all over Europe in motorized units, that those needs have diminished. I think, therefore, that Hitler had to go out to get those resources in order to carry on.[2]

MR. SCHUMAN: It is perhaps worth recalling that in September, 1936, at the Nuremburg party conference of the Nazis, Hitler said: "If I had the forests of Siberia and the mineral resources of the Urals and the wheat fields of the Ukraine, all of Germany would swim in plenty." He was then emphasizing the economic motive, but a few months thereafter he concluded with Japan the Anti-Comintern Accord for the purpose of causing the democratic world to believe that his sole purpose was to save the world from communism. I think he is going back to that now.

MR. JACOBY: To what, as a historian and political scientist, do you attribute this action of Germany?

MR. SCHUMAN: I would not leave out of account the economic considerations you have mentioned and a lot of strategic and military considerations which we won't try to discuss here; but I would want to emphasize, in terms of the Hitler record, the technique employed in disseminating anti-Semitic and anti-communist propaganda to soften and confuse and befuddle opinion in countries that are marked for conquest. There seems to me little doubt that in this situation the Nazi attack on Soviet Russia is calculated to confuse British and American opinion. I am not sure it will succeed, but I think that is one of the important motives here.

MR. JACOBY: What you have in mind is that, by charging that communist influence has prevented our defense effort from becom-

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[2] *Latest estimates have placed the number of activated German divisions at about 250—some four million men.*

ing effective and that communists are really the enemy of our way of life and by saying that Hitler is out fighting the communists, we will be less likely therefore to fight the people who are fighting the communists.

MR. ROPER: Of course, he always has this to rely on: He knows there is an undercurrent of feeling, in the United States at least, against the Soviet Union. However, he may have lost track of the fact that what we found in the *Fortune* survey in 1938 was that Russia was by no means the primary "bad boy" of Europe. As a matter of fact, she was a very poor second to Hitler in the Americans' public singling out and labeling as "bad boy" the various governments in Europe.

MR. JACOBY: Very true! But, if you go back before 1938, wasn't Russia regarded as the primary bad influence?

MR. ROPER: I think that is probably true, but there can be no doubt that from 1937 on Hitler has been the villain to most Americans.

MR. JACOBY: If we do have, then, these two possible explanations—real explanations—of Hitler's action, might we not also add a third: that Hitler sees in an invasion of Soviet Russia the means of getting around through the Caucasus and the Ukraine and the Caspian Sea down to Suez, that strategic canal which holds the key to the control of the rich resources of northern Africa.

MR. SCHUMAN: Doesn't that sound a bit like going all around Robin Hood's barn to challenge the power of the Soviet Union? To try to go around the Black Sea as a means of getting to Suez is a pretty roundabout route, after all.

MR. JACOBY: Yes, but Hitler may feel that he must resort to roundabout routes since the direct attack on the island of Britain has not succeeded.

MR. ROPER: Of course, none of us is a military expert. I

STRATEGIC RESOURCES OF THE UKRAINE AND CAUCASUS

SOURCE: SOTSIALISTICHESKOE STROITELSTVO SOYUZA SSSR, 1933-38

PERCENTAGE OF NATIONAL TOTAL PRODUCED IN THIS AREA: 1938

COAL

OIL

IRON ORE

PIG IRON

STEEL
[1937]

SUGAR
[1937]



EACH COMPLETE SYMBOL EQUALS 10 PER CENT

Total National Production (in millions of tons): Coal (1940), 164.6; Oil and Gas (1940), 34.2; Pig Iron (1940), 14.9; Steel (1940), 18.4; Sugar (1937, 1938), 3.5.

should be very much more interested to hear from Schuman, as a political scientist, why he thinks Hitler picked this particular week to act.

MR. SCHUMAN: Well, I think he picked this particular week to act because he—and the German high command—decided that no successful invasion of Britain is likely to be launched this summer and that no separate peace with Britain is likely to be made this summer.[3] Whatever Rudolf Hess's motives were in flying to Scotland, any hopes implicit in that adventure of a separate peace seem to have gone glimmering. And I think he decided to act at this time in large part because last week Uncle Sam was getting tough with the Axis.[4]

MR. JACOBY: You refer to the attack on Crete (which most of us thought was a proof that an island could be successfully invaded from the air). The German high command has thought that it did not demonstrate the possibility of invading Britain successfully.[5]

MR. SCHUMAN: Goebbels said it *did*, but the article in which Goebbels said that was withdrawn immediately from the German

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[3] *Hess, the No. 3 Nazi and successor to Hitler after Field Marshall Göring, flew a Messerschmitt 110 plane on May 10, 1941, from Augsburg, Germany, to the estate of the Duke of Hamilton, near Glasgow, Scotland. Hess was apprehended by a Scottish farmer and turned over to the authorities. He has been in close custody since, and no official statement has been made as to the reasons for the flight.*

[4] *In "freezing" European credits in this country, President Roosevelt attacked the sinking of the "Robin Moor" as "piracy" and as an evidence of a German aim to sweep America from the seas. Limitations were imposed upon further immigration, and German and Italian consulates were ordered closed by July 15.*

[5] *The first German parachute troops invaded Crete on May 20, 1940. By June 1 the Nazi conquest of the island was virtually complete, and "mopping-up" operations were under way.*

AMERICAN INVESTMENTS IN EUROPE
1940

DATA FROM U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

EACH COMPLETE SYMBOL EQUALS $50,000,000

press. It is simply inconceivable, in terms of the Nazi military record, that, if the Reich high command hopes for a successful invasion of Britain this summer, they would attack Soviet Russia now. I take it as established by the attack that they have no hope of defeating Britain definitively this summer.

MR. JACOBY: Whatever the political conclusions from Rudolf Hess's surprising descent from the skies in Britain may be, or whatever the Nazi high command's views may be on the possibility of knocking out the island of Britain, I think the main reason for the attack at this time was that Germany finds it necessary to hedge against the possibility that increasing American material aid to Britain will indefinitely prolong the war. The fact is that by June of 1942, about a year from now, that aid is going to be made available—in the absence of unforeseen events—on such a scale that Hitler can't win. The war will develop either into a stalemate or into a German defeat, and it is therefore incumbent on him to round out the economic resources of the Reich so that they can withstand such a long war.

MR. SCHUMAN: And it is incumbent upon him, too, to do everything in his power to interfere with American aid and to confuse the American war effort. The attack on the Soviet Union may serve both these purposes.

MR. JACOBY: Roper, you mentioned that Uncle Sam was getting tough and that that may have had some influence on the German action this morning. What did you mean?

MR. ROPER: I think the various things that have happened during this past week—the closing of the consulates and the cracking-down on immigration and the freezing of funds [*see illustrations, pages 9 and 13*]—all seem to the average American to be doing something more about crushing Hitlerism than just making speeches. I think this week's actions will seem important to the average American, aside from the German-Soviet war, because I

think it represents to him the "doing something" about a situation that most Americans had come to feel something needed to be done about.

MR. JACOBY: I hesitate to question your view because you are an expert on public opinion, but I am afraid that we may be interpreting the closing of the consulates and the freezing of funds as being far more important than they really are. As I see it, those actions are part of the technique necessary for dealing with totalitarian powers. It is inevitable that we must get rid of ways and means of conducting trade between business enterprises and between individuals when dealing with fascist states. The state must conduct those negotiations, and consulates have no real functions to perform except to spread propaganda where no business is done between German businesses and American businesses.

MR. ROPER: This may be simply a new device of a democratic nation for dealing with fascist states, but I think, nevertheless, that it is going to seem to the average citizen evidence of the fact that our leadership is coming forward to assume really a position of leadership. You might even say that some will hold that that leadership has today caught up with what the man on the street has been thinking.

MR. SCHUMAN: I would be interested in your views on that, Roper. The President said to Congress yesterday:

> *The United States will neither be intimidated, nor will it acquiesce in the plans for world-domination which the present leaders of Germany may have. We must take the sinking of the "Robin Moor" as a warning to the United States not to resist the Nazi movement of world-conquest. It is a warning that the United States may use the high seas of the world only with Nazi consent. Were we to yield on this, we would inevitably submit to world-domination of the present leaders of the German Reich. We are not yielding, and we do not propose to yield.*

Doesn't it seem to you, Roper, as a student of public opinion and

director of the *Fortune* poll, that the President, in using that language, has represented accurately the present views of the man on the street in the United States?

MR. ROPER: I think he has accurately represented the views of the average man. I think it might be said that—with the possible exception of this week—the only time he has been ahead of the average man in a desire to see something done about this war from the American standpoint was the day he made the Chicago "quarantine" speech.[6]

MR. JACOBY: How do you arrive at that conclusion? What is the evidence?

MR. ROPER: I like to go back to 1937 because I think you must get a picture of American public opinion as a small snowball rolling downhill and gathering weight and momentum as it goes.

MR. SCHUMAN: That was in the middle of the Spanish war, wasn't it? And the year in which the Japanese aggression against China was resumed.[7]

MR. JACOBY: Incidentally, the year in which the Soviet Union and Germany were fighting each other as they are now doing again.

MR. SCHUMAN: In Spain.

MR. ROPER: Let's take a look at 1937 from the standpoint of public opinion. The *Fortune* survey revealed that in that year the average American felt sure about three things. First, he felt that he did not want to fight any wars in anybody else's yard. Even the idea of defending South American countries from outright aggres-

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[6] *A speech delivered at a bridge dedication in Chicago in 1937, in which the President urged that aggressor states be "quarantined" to preserve peace.*

[7] *The Spanish civil war began in the summer of 1936, and Japanese attacks on China (the present continuing "Chinese incident") began in July, 1937.*



sion from foreign powers was opposed by better than a two-to-one majority.

MR. JACOBY: The average American, in other words, did not see total war.

MR. ROPER: He did not! The second thing was that he had an uneasy feeling, despite that, that there was a major world-combat brewing and that there was a definite chance that it would sooner or later directly involve the United States.

MR. SCHUMAN: You mean he did not have any faith in the neutrality legislation which was going to keep us out?

MR. ROPER: I think where he placed his faith is plainly indicated by the third thing which was positively in his mind, and that was that—despite his desire to stay home and not look far afield for wars—a great majority was prepared for and anxious to see a heavy rearmament program. As a matter of fact, 77 per cent voted in

July, 1937, in favor of building an army and navy so strong that no one would dare attack us.

MR. SCHUMAN: This was 77 per cent of the American public as measured by the *Fortune* poll.

MR. ROPER: Yes. These same three dominant attitudes carried over through 1938. We continue to find in these *Fortune* polls no desire to get involved in the war. The public was almost evenly divided as late as October, 1938, over the question of whether or not they would even be willing to defend Mexico if that country were affected by armed invasion.

MR. JACOBY: Was that poll of American public opinion taken before the Munich conference?

MR. ROPER: That was before.

MR. SCHUMAN: No, October was after—I'm sorry! That would have been just after Munich. The Munich conference was September 30, 1938.

MR. ROPER: You're right!

MR. JACOBY: So that would have reflected, then, the attitudes of people after the Munich affair.

MR. ROPER: Yes, but these Americans continued to fear that world-affairs were shaping up in such a way that we might, nevertheless, get involved. They did not like the sound of Munich, and they were even more determined to arm, and to arm rapidly—82 per cent, as against 77 per cent the year before, were in favor of an all-out effort.

In 1938, however, we found the beginnings of another attitude which I think was destined to play an important part in the public's opinion. This was a feeling on the part of the public that they now knew who was the villain in the world, and the name now was Adolf Hitler.

MR. JACOBY: People by that time had come to realize that Hitler's word concerning no further territorial ambitions in Europe meant nothing.

MR. ROPER: That was right after the Czech crisis . . . .

MR. JACOBY: Yes.

MR. ROPER: . . . . and the average American interpreted the Czech crisis as an indication of Hitler's desire to rule all of Europe and of his greed for the wealth of his neighbors. We come now to 1939.

MR. SCHUMAN: The year of the outbreak of the war.

MR. ROPER: Things were beginning to change, particularly after the war had actually started. The majority still felt that they wanted no part of the war, but 83 per cent actually wanted the Allies to win against 2 per cent who wanted Germany to win. Only 3 per cent wanted to go to war on the side of the Allies at once. However, increased majorities regarded Hitler as the real villain. Sentiment was crystallizing that he was a menace; sentiment for preventing armed invasion of certain countries—such as Mexico, Brazil, and Bermuda—increased, but it was far from being at fever heat. The year 1939 saw the emergence of a new attitude which was also destined to become increasingly important in America's total attitude as the months went on.

MR. JACOBY: And which also, I presume, would be crystallized as a result of the unexpectedly rapid fall of Poland.

MR. ROPER: I think that's right, and this was an emergence of a two-to-one majority which believed in October, 1939, that Germany presented a real threat to the United States in the event of victory over the Allies. This was followed by the beginnings of a desire to see Hitler crushed to earth rather than to see any peace dictated by him, wholly or in part.

MR. JACOBY: Do these attitudes represent what we might call

"balance-of-power" politics? When one nation is getting too powerful, we automatically begin to favor its opponents and to hope to see its power diminished.

MR. ROPER: I think that, whatever charges can be leveled against American foreign policy, you can't hold that throughout history they have played "power politics."

MR. SCHUMAN: What you are saying is that, on the basis of this evidence from the *Fortune* poll—if I understand the evidence correctly—from 1937 on you had first a slow and later a rapid accumulation of sentiment in this country: a sentiment of apprehension over Hitler's ambitions; a sentiment of animosity toward Hitler; a sentiment ultimately involving the possibility of having to fight Hitler for the security of America. But isn't it still true that four out of five Americans today are opposed to the United States' entry into the war?

MR. ROPER: I think you could go further than that. I suspect that five out of five Americans are opposed to the idea of war.

MR. SCHUMAN: That makes it unanimous.

MR. ROPER: But what this shows, I think, is that Americans were coming to feel that they were not confronted with just a question of whether or not they liked war; they felt—rightly or wrongly—that they were confronted with the question of whether or not they were going to have war; whether they liked war less than a Hitler-dominated world. Correctly or incorrectly, our survey showed that during 1940 feeling that Hitler was out to dominate the world and that this meant domination of the United States increased rapidly.

MR. JACOBY: And in 1940 France fell very rapidly, which would seem to indicate that that belligerency increased directly in proportion as the power of Hitler became evident.

MR. SCHUMAN: And Hitler's problem then, and Hitler's prob-

BLACK SEA NAVAL STRENGTH

[RELIABLE DATA ON GERMAN STRENGTH NOT AVAILABLE]

lem now, is to do everything that he can to reverse this stream of opinion which we have been reviewing here.

MR. ROPER: Yes, but by early 1941 we find that that stream has reached such proportions that it isn't going to be easy to reverse. Early in 1941 over 70 per cent of the people said flatly that they thought Hitler's ambition was to dominate the United States, and a third of them felt he had a good chance of doing it if England fell.

MR. SCHUMAN: That raises the central question, at least in my judgment: Is it likely that Hitler's primary aim is going to be successful? Do you think the attack on Russia is likely to confuse American opinion and slow American arms output and achieve that

degree of systematic befuddlement which the Nazis are aiming at in our country?

MR. JACOBY: Wait, Schuman! I would object to your use of the expression "primary aim." It does not seem to me at all possible that Hitler's prime aim in moving in on the Soviet Union is to befuddle. I think we must go back to the basic economic factor that Germany must have Russian resources in order to round out the Continental economy; in order to prepare herself for what may be a very long war.

MR. SCHUMAN: I agree with that.

MR. JACOBY: That is the basic factor and not the psychological one.

MR. SCHUMAN: But the two are not readily separable.

MR. ROPER: I should certainly agree that Hitler's economic aims are uppermost in his mind and certainly are more likely to be attained. I think that American opinion has gone too far to be befuddled by any red herring that he might now seek to draw across it.

MR. JACOBY: I think you are being a little too optimistic about that, Roper. After all, we must remember that there is a good deal of evidence in favor of the view that the American effort is going to be slowed down by the fact that Russia is now in the war.

MR. SCHUMAN: The man on the street may be saying now: "Britain has an ally, and there is really no necessity for giving any considerable additional aid."

MR. JACOBY: Right! And he might also say: "If Russia should collapse quickly, as Poland did, Hitler is invincible, so what's the use of giving aid?"

MR. ROPER: I think you both underestimate the common sense of the common man.

MR. JACOBY: I don't like to face that accusation!

MR. SCHUMAN: Nor I!

MR. ROPER: I think probably what might happen is that when you find he is deficient in information on any given subject, you conclude then that he is wrong. As a matter of fact, the common man—while often deficient in information—is long on common sense, and he has analyzed this thing for three years. He's got a fixed notion that here is a menace. Remember, these people are not interested in the war to help Britain only.

MR. SCHUMAN: Certainly they would not be interested in the war to help Soviet Russia.

MR. ROPER: No, not at all! They are interested in this war for one reason: they want to defend America. They regard Hitler as a menace, and I think they are willing to welcome England or Russia or almost anybody else who also wants to fight. I am talking about the common man.

MR. JACOBY: But, Roper, the common man in the United States—whether he is a businessman or a worker in a factory—has witnessed a good deal of propaganda against communism and against Russia very recently. We find a widespread hatred and suspicion of communistic institutions among American business leadership. We find charges hurled that some of the recent strikes in the defense industry were fomented by communists,[8] and it hardly seems to me that the ground is very fertile to spread love or alliance with the communists at the present time.

MR. ROPER: We don't have to think of ourselves as making an alliance with the Soviet Union in that sense. We only have to think of ourselves as welcoming another person who wants to fight on our side.

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[8] *Such as the Allis-Chalmers strike in Milwaukee and that at the North American Aircraft Corporation in California.*

MR. SCHUMAN: And we have to think of ourselves, it seems to me, in terms of thwarting Hitler's purpose of dividing us further against ourselves and finding ourselves taken in by the anti-communist bogey.

MR. JACOBY: Again I must debate that point with you, Schuman. I don't think that Hitler is at all in doubt about the attitude of Americans toward his ambitions. Signore Gayda, the eminent Italian commentator who speaks officially for Mussolini, has already said in words and editorials that America is already in the war and that Italy realizes it, and so does Germany. I don't think that Hitler is counting on influencing American public opinion away from what they now admit to be the American attitude.

MR. SCHUMAN: But, even if we had declared war, it would still be advantageous for Hitler to confuse and divide us in order to paralyze our war effort; and the crisis of the moment, it seems to me, is, among others, a lesson of unity.

Prime Minister Churchill—who is going to speak to the world in a few minutes—said last Monday that the enslaving of Europe by the Nazis was the result of disunity, and he asked, "Is this tragedy to repeat itself once more?" His answer was: "No! Not so easily shall the onward progress of the people be barred; not so easily shall the lights of freedom die. Every month that passes adds to the length and the perils of the journey that has to be made. United we stand; divided we fall. Divided, the dark ages return; united, we can save and guide the world."

If we should take that as our guide in this crisis, we should be virtually immune from Hitler's technique at the moment.

MR. JACOBY: The fact is, too, that the American public wants to back a winner in the war. Do you think that is a common attitude, Roper?

MR. ROPER: I think that is quite true; but, in trying to speculate on how much effect that is going to have, you must not forget that we've only got time for one big hate, and that seems, to the average American, to be Hitler.

MR. JACOBY: In any event, as the events of the week take their place in the pages of American history, we can see that they are part of a continuous stream of events whose origin lies far back in the past. When we look underneath the superficial explanation given for this Russian war by Chancellor Hitler, we find real causes. First, Germany's economic need to get resources; second, the military need of outflanking Turkey and British positions in the Near East; and, third, the psychological need of confusing American opinion and slowing down the defense effort. This last of Hitler's motives is the least evident, but it may be the most important for Americans. We must not permit our actions to be guided by sentiment for or against any foreign power. We must maintain a wholesome realism in deciding what is right for America.

OBJECTIVE QUESTIONS FOR EXAMINATION

The answers to the following questions may be found in the text of the broadcast, and page references are provided to assist in locating the answers.

*

1. List several nations (in addition to the Soviet Union) which have "attacked" the German Reich, according to German statements. Page 4.
2. Name at least two needs of the Reich which could be obtained in the Ukraine and the Caucasus. Page 4.
3. Before the war Germany produced how much of its food within its frontiers? How much of its oil? Page 5.
4. What evidence is cited to support the statement that "Uncle Sam has been getting tough with the Axis"? Page 10.
5. What may have been the conclusion drawn by the German high command from the invasion of Crete? Page 8.
6. Early in 1941, according to the *Fortune* poll, what percentage of Americans believed Hitler's ambition was to dominate the United States? Page 17.
7. In analyzing German reasons for the aggression against the Soviet Union, name three important motives in the following fields (pages 4, 5, and 6):
   a) Economic
   b) Military
   c) Psychological

QUESTIONS FOR ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

The following questions of wider scope, intended for discussion, are suggested by the broadcast, and answers may be found in the literature on the subject listed in the section "Suggested Readings," found on page 24.

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1. It is suggested that "no sound economic basis exists for a Russo-German accord." Discuss and appraise this statement, bearing in mind the trade policies and the economic needs of the German Reich.
2. If it is true, as one of the speakers suggests, that Germany hopes to "confuse and corrupt" American thinking, how would this occur, how would such an effect be evident, and what should be done about it? Discuss.
3. It has been suggested that, with Germany turning its military strength against the Soviet Union, Great Britain and the United States are no longer in as great danger as they were. Do you agree? Should the national defense program and the aid-Britain program be curtailed? Discuss.
4. The flight to Britain by Rudolf Hess has been connected with the latest turn of the war. Do you see any relationship between these two events? Do you agree that "any hopes implicit in that adventure of a separate peace seem to have gone glimmering"?
5. Review the three primary aims for the German attack upon the Soviet Union and list them in the order of their importance. Discuss each of these motives in terms of the likelihood of their achievement.
6. Immediately following the ROUND TABLE discussion Winston Churchill promised aid to the Soviet Union in its defense against Germany. What should be America's attitude toward aiding Russia? Should the U.S.S.R. become a beneficiary under the Lease-Lend Act? Discuss.

SUGGESTED READINGS

HARPER, SAMUEL; LAVES, WALTER; and MACNAIR, HARLEY, *The Soviet Union and America*, a University of Chicago ROUND TABLE broadcast December 1, 1940, *analyzing the relations of the United States and the Soviet Union and indicating some of the areas within which these relations might be improved, especially in terms of mutual interests in the Far East.*

MOORE, HARRIET, "The Soviets 'Keep Their Powder Dry,' " *American Review on the Soviet Union*, June, 1941. *A general review of Soviet foreign policy in 1941 and the steps Russia has taken to preserve her neutral status despite menaces from the West and from the Orient.*

PEARSON, DREW, and ALLEN, ROBERT S., "Will There Be a U.S.—Russian Alliance?" *Look*, September 10, 1940. *The facts behind, and the conditions for, an alliance between the Soviet Union and the United States.*

WERNER, MAX, *Military Strength of the Powers.* New York: Modern Age Books, 1939. *A concise volume, written some months before the outbreak of the present war, containing valuable information about the armed force of the Soviet Union—the air and tank potential of the Red army, its training and tactics, and a considerable section devoted to a consideration of the conditions and possible results of a Russo-German conflict.*

———, *Battle for the World.* New York: Modern Age Books, 1941. *A volume of military criticism based on the lessons of the first twenty months of the war, again with considerable attention to the power and position of the Red army and the Russian air force, especially in view of the operations against Finland.*

WOLFE, HENRY C., "Keep an Eye on Russia," *Harper's*, April, 1941. *An analysis of Russo-German relations and an evaluation of the efforts of each power to outmaneuver the other in moves "short of shooting."*

The Listeners' Round Table . . . .

Letters to the ROUND TABLE *frequently contain interesting and illuminating sidelights on the subject matter discussed on the air. These comments are from letters received following the broadcast discussion of "The Crisis and Your Pocketbook" June 15, 1941.*

*

That One-Third

Only a short time ago—in fact, less than three years—we were told that a third of the nation was ill-fed. It does not seem that any event has taken place to alter that condition very much, though some people do have steadier work due to the defense program, but that, too (like all things on earth), will come to an end. Yet the thirty-billion-dollar defense bill will be unpaid, and so will the national debt be unpaid.

It is self-evident that if a man's income remains fixed while the articles necessary for his well-being rise in price, then the man buys less for the same amount of money.

It is a waste of breath to tell a class of people who were labeled "ill-fed" not to buy overstuff furniture, new automobiles, radios, electric refrigerators, or, for that matter, anything that is new, for certainly they won't have the money to buy with, and it is doubtful if a finance company would finance an easy-payment plan for such a class of people.

By what we heard said on the radio today by the participants in the discussion on the ROUND TABLE, things are going to be tough on all classes of people. May I ask the question: How are those people—that is, the third who were underfed—going to make the grade on their own power when their money buys less for them to eat?

When one considers the fact that 39 per cent of all the young men called in the draft were rejected as being physically unfit for military service in the United States Army, there seems to be a close relationship in percentages between the young men found physically unfit for military service and the statement that a third of the nation was ill-fed.

W. A. G., Michigan

*

Frank

This discussion was as clear an indication of the approach of totalitarianism to our country as has yet reached my attention. It is brutally

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Tananarivo

?

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frank but is to be commended for its very frankness. I wonder what Maynard Krueger would have to say to it?

F. M., Jr., New Jersey

*

Hitler Laughs

Heard your broadcast Sunday, June 15. It sure is amusing to hear you people talk about our democracy; you should say "our fake democracy," a country where 10 per cent of the people own 90 per cent of the wealth, where there are forty-five million underfed and ill-housed people, hungry because we raise too much to eat, where we spend seventy million dollars for one battleship and give a state pension of twenty dollars per month to a man seventy years old. Is it any wonder that Hitler laughs at us and our democracy where the people rule?

P. R., Iowa

*

Sound

Permit me to congratulate you on the finest and most rational program today. Your views on instalment buying, housing, and "postponement investment" we found very sound. Hope Washington takes your advice.

C. B., Louisiana

*

Distinction

I am greatly surprised to note the glaring use of wrong terms in alluding to the British situation in the war.

Such terms as the following were used: "the English Parliament," "the English Navy," "if England wins the war," "if England can defeat Germany."

There is no English Parliament; but there *is* a British Parliament. There is no English Navy; but there *is* a British Navy. King George was crowned not King of England but King of Britain. The Empire has many armies—Canadian, Australian, New Zealand, South African—but it has no English Army. It has a *British* Army, which includes England, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland.

R. MacL., Ontario

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LISTS

OF 1938–39 TRANSCRIPTS STILL IN PRINT WILL BE SENT UPON REQUEST. STUDENTS AND TEACHERS WILL FIND THESE ISSUES TO BE VALUABLE COMMENTARIES UPON EVENTS OF THE PERIOD.

Nos.

1940

98. *The Jews*
101. *Tariff Walls*
104. *Is America's Economic Frontier Closed?*
105. *Must the World Unite?*
106. *Can We Protect America?*
111. *Where's That War Boom?*
113. *Blitzkrieg, May, 1940*
114. *America and the Peacemongers*
115. *Babies Cost Money*
117. *Have We Time to Think?*
119. *America's Capacity to Arm*
120. *Economic Union for the Americas*
121. *Civil Liberties and the Fifth Column*
122. *M-Day and America*
125. *The New France*
126. *What Really Happened at Havana?*
128. *Blitzkrieg on Britain*
129. *Should America Aid Britain?*
131. *Can Germany Conquer Latin America?*
132. *Conscript Wealth, Too?*
134. *Will Hitler Attack America Next?*
137. *Warmongers and Appeasers*
138. *Polls and the Election*
140. *World Revolution*
141. *Art and Our Warring World*
142. *The Soviet Union and America*

Nos.

143. *Is Hitler Revolutionizing Britain?*
144. *Where Are Those 50,000 Planes?*
146. *1951: The Next Decade in Education*

1941

147. *More Aid to Britain Now?*
148. *Is This Our War?*
149. *Morale: First Line of Defense?*
150. *Can Capitalism Defend America?*
152. *Can the Americas Be Invaded?*
153. *Guns or Butter?*
154. *Dilemma in the Far East*
155. *How to Fight Nazi Propaganda*
156. *The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*
157. *Strikes and National Defense*
158. *Defense Economics*
159. *Should America Convoy to Britain?*
160. *Balkan Blitzkrieg*
161. *War Aims and Peace Aims*
162. *Which Road for America?*
163. *Lessons from Europe's War*
164. *The Effect of the Blitzkrieg on the Economic Order*
165. *Defense and America's Health*
166. *Roosevelt* vs. *Hitler*
167. *Polls and the Crisis*
168. *Where's Bunker Hill?*
169. *War against the Middle Classes?*
170. *The Crisis and Your Pocketbook.* June 15

ALL ROUND TABLE TRANSCRIPTS CONTAIN ADDED FACTUAL MATERIAL IN THE FORM OF GRAPHS, MAPS, PICTOGRAPHS, FOOTNOTES, BIBLIOGRAPHIES, ETC.

ROUND TABLE NETWORK

2:30 P.M. EASTERN DAYLIGHT SAVING TIME

City	Call Letters	Kilocycles	City	Call Letters	Kilocycles
Boston, Mass.	WNAC	1260	Portland, Me.	WCSH	970
Buffalo, N.Y.	WBEN	930	Providence, R.I.	WJAR	920
New York, N.Y.	WEAF	660	Rochester, N.Y.	WHAM	1180
Philadelphia, Pa.	KYW	1060	Schenectady, N.Y.	WGY	810
Pittsburgh, Pa.	WCAE	1250			

1:30 P.M. EASTERN STANDARD TIME

Altoona, Pa.	WFBG	1340	Jacksonville, Fla.	WJAX	930
Asheville, N.C.	WISE	1400	Johnstown, Pa.	WJAC	1400
Atlanta, Ga.	WSB	750	Lakeland, Fla.	WLAK	1340
Charleston, S.C.	WTMA	1250	Lima, Ohio	WLOK	1240
Charlotte, N.C.	WSOC	1240	Miami, Fla.	WIOD	610
Cleveland, Ohio	WTAM	1100	Norfolk, Va.	WTAR	790
Columbia, S.C.	WIS	560	Raleigh, N.C.	WPTF	680
Columbus, Ohio	WCOL	1230	Richmond, Va.	WMBG	1380
Dayton, Ohio	WING	1410	Savannah, Ga.	WSAV	1340
Detroit, Mich.	WWJ	950	Springfield, Ohio	WIZE	1340
Florence, S.C.	WOLS	1230	Tampa, Fla.	WFLA	970
Grand Rapids, Mich.	WOOD	1300	Washington, D.C.	WRC	980
Greenville, S.C.	WFBC	1330	Winston-Salem, N.C.	WSJS	600

1:30 P.M. CENTRAL DAYLIGHT SAVING TIME

Chicago, Ill.	WMAQ	670	Memphis, Tenn.	WMC	790
Fort Wayne, Ind.	WGL	1450			

12:30 P.M. CENTRAL STANDARD TIME

Amarillo, Texas	KGNC	1440	Milwaukee, Wis.	WTMJ	620
Birmingham, Ala.	WBRC	960	Minneapolis and St. Paul, Minn.	KSTP	1500
Bismarck, N.D.	KFYR	550	New Orleans, La.	WSMB	1350
Bristol, Tenn.	WOPI	1490	Oklahoma City, Okla.	WKY	930
Dallas-Fort Worth, Tex.	WBAP	820	Omaha, Neb.	WOW	590
Des Moines, Iowa	WHO	1040	Rochester, Minn.	KROC	1340
El Paso, Texas	KTSM	1380	St. Cloud, Minn.	KFAM	1450
Evansville, Ind.	WGBF	1280	St. Louis, Mo.	KSD	550
Fargo, N.D.	WDAY	970	San Antonio, Texas	WOAI	1200
Jackson, Miss.	WJDX	1300	Shreveport, La.	KTBS	1480
Kansas City, Mo.	WDAF	610	Springfield, Mo.	KGBX	1260
Kingsport, Tenn.	WKPT	1400	Terre Haute, Ind.	WBOW	1230
Little Rock, Ark.	KARK	920	Tulsa, Okla.	KVOO	1170
Louisville, Ky.	WAVE	970	Wichita, Kans.	KANS	1240
Mankato, Minn.	KYSM	1230			

11:30 A.M. MOUNTAIN STANDARD TIME

Albuquerque, N.M.	KOB	1030	Phoenix, Ariz.	KTAR	620
Boise, Ida.	KIDO	1380	Pocatello, Ida.	KSEI	930
Bozeman, Mont.	KRBM	1450	Salt Lake City, Utah	KDYL	1320
Butte, Mont.	KGIR	1370	Tucson, Ariz.	KVOA	1290
Denver, Colo.	KOA	850	Twin Falls, Ida.	KTFI	1270
Helena, Mont.	KPFA	1240			

10:30 A.M. PACIFIC STANDARD TIME

Fresno, Cal.	KMJ	580	Sacramento, Cal.	KFBK	1530
Los Angeles, Cal.	KFI	640	San Francisco, Cal.	KPO	680
Medford, Ore.	KMED	1440	Seattle, Wash.	KOMO	950
Portland, Ore.	KGW	620	Spokane, Wash.	KHQ	590

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JUNE 29, 1941

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SPEAKERS TO BE ANNOUNCED

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SUGGESTED READINGS

BALDWIN, H. W., "Naval Defense of America," *Harper's,* April, 1941.

LIPPMANN, WALTER, "The Atlantic and America," *Life,* April 7, 1941.

PRATT, W. V., "America's Problem in Sea Power," *Newsweek,* January 13, 1941.

STIMSON, HENRY L., "Defend Our Seas with Our Navy," *Vital Speeches,* May 15, 1941.

"War for Sea Power," *Christian Century,* April 16, 1941.

[PRINTED IN U.S.A.]